Threat Assessment and Active Shooter Prevention
The phrase ‘left of boom’ is a military idiom used to describe efforts that aim to prevent and protect military personnel from exposure to roadside bombs or improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The ‘boom’ refers to the detonation of the IED, and the ‘left’ side refers to the time (not distance) preceding the detonation. Left of boom efforts can be long, medium, or short-term. The more time between the intervention and the detonation, the more ‘left of boom’ it is.
Some interventions help detect the presence of bombs moments before they are about to detonate. For example, sensors can be used to detect them in front of moving vehicles, and then steps can be taken to prevent detonation. This is more short-term and immediate. Medium- or long-term efforts occur further left of boom. An example of this is when military personnel use observation posts to deter the placement of IEDs. In the latter, there is more time between the intervention and the detonation, so it is considered further left of boom.
Any effort to protect our soldiers from IEDs is important and should be pursued, though initially, I didn’t like the phrase ‘left of boom.’ However, I find the underlying thought process useful when I think about other problems, like active-shooter prevention.
Different active shooter prevention efforts can be assessed according to how far ‘left of boom’ they are. For you, thinking about prevention this way might help you brainstorm ideas for protecting your community.
For the purposes of this post, we will rely on the FBI definition of an active shooter incident: i.e., when an individual is “actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a populated area.” This would include incidents such as the 2016 Pulse Nightclub shooting or the 2017 shooting on the Las Vegas strip.
Unfortunately, the prevalence of active shooter incidents has been increasing over time, with 2020 statistics showing a 100% increase since 2016 and a 33% increase since 2019. As such, the need for active shooter prevention and training is becoming more and more apparent.
Threat Assessment and Active Shooter Prevention
Active shooter prevention usually involves some kind of threat assessment approach. Threat assessment involves evaluating and verifying perceived threats and assessing their likelihood of occurring. Different threat assessment approaches focus on different challenges and occur at different points in time to identify long-standing threats as well as immediate threats.
Let’s take a moment and re-visit the different challenges different threat assessment efforts might be trying to solve. Some of these approaches include:
Security Threat Risk Assessment: Plan for and protect facilities and critical infrastructure against attacks;
Violence Threat Risk Assessment: Assess the likelihood that a specific individual will engage in some form of violent behavior in the future;
Threat Assessment for Instrumental Violence: Identify, assess, and intervene with a person who may commit a targeted attack (e.g. a shooting at a specific time and location); and
Active Threat Assessment: Help law enforcement or security personnel to identify and react to threatening individuals (such as active shooters).
More detailed descriptions of each threat assessment approach can be found in our Guide to Threat Assessment Approaches for Law Enforcement.
A Model of Active Shooter Threat Assessment Approaches
To understand the different types of threat assessment and their relevance to active shooter prevention, I have included a visual aid. In Figure 1, you will see the different forms of threat assessment and their relevance to an active shooter incident. Time is established based on the time before an event (or how far left of boom). I also divided the threat assessment approaches based on whether they are environmental or individual. The different spacing between the hash marks along the horizontal axis convey the increasing time-distance from an incident.
Figure 1. Active Shooter Threat Assessment Approaches
Now, let’s think about the different forms of threat assessment and how left of boom each is from an active shooter incident.
The Security Risk Threat Assessment
Security Risk Threat Assessment is pretty far left of boom. It is environmental and involves identifying and protecting a specific location from threats. Examples include things like improving access control and surveillance, developing emergency preparedness plans, or establishing hardened locations to protect victims from a potential active shooter.
Security risk threat assessment is helpful in the long term for preventing or mitigating damage, though it becomes less relevant in the short term. More detailed information about security risk threat assessment can be found in our Guide to Threat Assessment Approaches for Security Professionals.
The Violence Threat Risk Assessment
The individually-focused Violence Threat Risk Assessment is also far left of boom. This approach involves assessing an individual’s propensity toward future violent behavior over the long-term. It is not necessarily tied to the commission of a specific violent act, but rather the person in general. This is important because an individual can exhibit important warning signs years prior to committing a severe violent act.
This approach can be coupled with an Instrumental Violence Threat Assessment if an individual warrants further intervention. Police can also engage in offender-focused policing strategies to learn more about prolific offenders and their activities.
Threat Assessment for Instrumental Violence
Because it involves the intersection of a location, a time, and an individual who might be planning an active shooter incident, the Instrumental Violence Threat Assessment is both environmentally and individually focused. It involves efforts to identify, assess, and intervene with individuals who may commit a targeted violent act at a specific location (e.g., a school or workplace).
This approach is relevant to active shooter prevention in the short- and medium-term. This can include looking out for common behaviors that individuals may exhibit in the weeks prior to committing a targeted shooting. For more information on common pre-attack behaviors, see the FBI’s Active Shooter Quick Reference Guide.
Active Threat Assessment
Active Threat Assessment is relevant in the short-term, typically right before an incident occurs (i.e., just left of boom). This approach focuses on the environment and individuals in it. It could also be combined with some of the other approaches. For example, active threat assessment can help identify individuals warranting further evaluation, or it can help to identify external threats to a certain location (such as someone conducting surveillance).
Active Threat Assessment is relevant to active shooter prevention, particularly in the medium- and short-term. One key part of this approach is that it can help you identify persons who are carrying weapons. It can also help you anticipate potential threats through the identification of behavioral indicators.
The police response to an active shooter incident involves additional tactical skills and policy considerations in addition to those mentioned here. For more information regarding the myriad of things to consider during an active shooter incident, see the FBI’s active shooter resource page, read through critical incident reviews of past attacks, or connect with other departments on the FBI’s secure Law Enforcement Enterprise Portal (LEEP). You can also view policy recommendations in the IACP’s Model Policy for dealing with active shooters.
Thinking About Active Shooter Threat Assessment and Prevention
Each of the threat assessment approaches outlined here is important to active shooter prevention in different ways. Each may also be relevant to different communities and facilities.
The nature of the location will also impact prevention efforts. Some locations are more secure (such as federal facilities), while others allow people to move around freely in and out. Other locations have a mix of secure and open areas. All are challenging to protect in different ways.
Thinking about each of these approaches and their time-distance from an incident (i.e., how far left of boom) will help you identify gaps in your community’s active shooter prevention efforts. After identifying gaps, you can begin to identify resources and training that can keep your officers and communities safe.
If you would like to learn more about active threat assessment or active threat assessment training, please don’t hesitate to contact us.
-
American Society of Safety Professionals (ASSP). (2019). “Preparing for an Active Shooter Incident.” American Society of Safety Professionals. Retrieved April 2022 from https://www.assp.org/news-and-articles/preparing-for-an-active-shooter-incident
Amman, M., Gibson, K. A., Bowlin, M., Griffin, S. H., Buckles, L., Kennedy, K., Burton, K. C., Robbins, C. J., & Brunell, K. F. (2015). Making prevention a reality: Identifying, assessing, and managing the threat of targeted attacks. Washington, D.C.: Behavioral Threat Assessment Center, FBI. Retrieved April 2022 from https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/making-prevention-a-reality.pdf/view
Atkinson, Rick. (2007). “The IED problem Problem is getting Getting out Out of controlControl. We've got Got to stop Stop the bleedingBleeding.” Washington Post. Available atRetrieved April 2022 https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/29/AR2007092900751_pf.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/29/AR2007092900751.html?sid=ST2007092900754.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). (2015). Planning and responding to an active shooter: An Interagency Security Committee policy and best practices guide. Washington, D.C.: Interagency Security Committee, DHS. Retrieved April 2022 from https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/isc-planning-response-active-shooter-guide-non-fouo-nov-2015-508.pdf
Dorn, M. (2016). “20 Active Shooter and Active Killer Prevention Strategies.” Campus Safety Magazine. Retrieved April 2022 from https://gcti.com/20-active-shooter-and-active-killer-prevention-strategies/
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). (2018). “A Global Approach to Rooting Out Terrorism.” Retrieved April 2022 from https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/ilea-training-rooting-out-terrorism-080218
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). (2021). Active shooter incidents in the United States in 2020. Washington, D.C.: FBI, Department of Justice. Retrieved April 2022 from https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/active-shooter-incidents-in-the-us-2020-070121.pdf/view
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). (2021). Active shooter incidents in the United States in 2020. Washington, D.C.: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice. Retrieved April 2022 from https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/active-shooter-incidents-in-the-us-2020-070121.pdf/view
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). (N.D.) Active shooter study: Quick reference guide. Washington, D.C.: FBI. Retrieved April 2022 from https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/as-study-quick-reference-guide-updated1.pdf/view
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). (N.D.). “Active Shooter Resources.” Retrieved April 2022 from https://www.fbi.gov/about/partnerships/office-of-partner-engagement/active-shooter-resources
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). (N.D.). “The Law Enforcement Enterprise Portal (LEEP).” Retrieved April 2022 from https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/leep
Gharibian, E. (N.D.). “Violence Risk Assessments: A Guide to Evaluating Risk in Criminal Cases.” Verdugo Psychological Associates. Retrieved April 2022 from https://verdugopsych.com/violence-risk-assessments-a-guide-to-evaluating-violence-risk-in-criminal-cases/
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) Law Enforcement Policy Center. (2018). Active shooter model policy. Washington, D.C.: IACP. Retrieved April 2022 from https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/2021-07/ActiveShooter2018-UpdatedFormat%2007.16.2021_0.pdf
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). (N.D.). “After Action Review.” Retrieved April 2022 from https://www.theiacp.org/after-action-review
Lankford, A. (2018). Identifying potential mass shooters and suicide terrorists with warning signs of suicide, perceived victimization, and desires for attention or fame. Journal of Personality Assessment, 100(5), 471-482. Retrieved April 2022 from https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00223891.2018.1436063
Marcou, D. (2019). “After-Action Review: Route 91 Harvest Music Festival Mass Shooting.” PoliceOne. Retrieved April 2022 from https://www.police1.com/active-shooter/articles/after-action-review-route-91-harvest-music-festival-mass-shooting-Ujz7O1z77ibVGb4F/
Miller, A. (2014). “Threat Assessment in Action.” American Psychological Association. Retrieved April 2022 from https://www.apa.org/monitor/2014/02/cover-threat
National Association of School Psychologists (NASP). (2015). “Threat Assessment at School.” National Association of School Psychologists. Retrieved April 2022 from https://www.nasponline.org/resources-and-publications/resources-and-podcasts/school-safety-and-crisis/systems-level-prevention/threat-assessment-at-school
Police Executive Research Forum (PERF). (2014). The police response to active shooter incidents. Washington, D.C.: PERF. Retrieved April 2022 from https://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Critical_Issues_Series/the%20police%20response%20to%20active%20shooter%20incidents%202014.pdf
Rugala, E. A., & Isaacs, A. R. (2003). Workplace violence: Issues in response. Washington, D.C.: National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime (NCAVC), the Federal Bureau of Investigations. Retrieved April 2022 from https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/workplace-violence-issues-response
Silver, J., Simons, A., & Craun, S. (2018). A study of the pre-attack behaviors of active shooters in the United States between 2000 and 2013. Washington, DC: National Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice. Retrieved April 2022 from https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/pre-attack-behaviors-of-active-shooters-in-us-2000-2013.pdf/view
Spanheimer, J. (2018). “Active Shooter Response: Developing a Tactical Playbook.” The Police Chief. Retrieved April 2022 from https://www.policechiefmagazine.org/active-shooter-response-playbook/
Walsh, Z., Swogger, M. T., & Kosson, D. S. (2009). Psychopathy and instrumental violence: Facet level relationships. Journal of Personality Disorders, 23(4), 416-424. Retrieved April 2022 from https://guilfordjournals.com/doi/epdf/10.1521/pedi.2009.23.4.416
Wood, M. “10 Lessons from the Pulse Nightclub Shooting.” (2018). PoliceOne. Retrieved April 2022 from https://www.police1.com/police-products/tactical/articles/10-lessons-from-the-pulse-nightclub-shooting-QPM5nPmTwM5nRgvz/